



Havarikommisjonen

Accident Investigation Board Denmark

Statement 2021-406



Serious incident to OY-JRY (ATR 42-300) at Karup (EKKA) on 16-11-2021.

ISSUED DECEMBER 2021

INTRODUCTION

This statement reflects the opinion of the Danish Accident Investigation Board regarding the circumstances of the occurrence and its causes and consequences.

In accordance with the provisions of EU Regulation 996/2010, the Danish Air Navigation Act and pursuant to Annex 13 of the International Civil Aviation Convention, the safety investigation is of an exclusively technical and operational nature, and its objective is not the assignment of blame or liability.

The safety investigation was carried out without having necessarily used legal evidence procedures and with no other basic aim than preventing future accidents and serious incidents.

Consequently, any use of this statement for purposes other than preventing future accidents and serious incidents may lead to erroneous or misleading interpretations.

A reprint with source reference may be published without separate permit.

GENERAL

State file number:	2021-406
UTC date:	16-11-2021
UTC time:	15:25
Occurrence class:	Serious incident
Location:	Karup (EKKA)
Injury level:	None
Aircraft registration:	OY-JRY
Aircraft make/model:	ATR 42-300
Current flight rules:	Instrument Flight Rules (IFR)
Operation type:	Scheduled
Flight phase:	Take off
Aircraft category:	Fixed wing
Last departure point:	EKKA
Planned destination:	Copenhagen, Kastrup (EKCH)
Aircraft damage:	Minor
Engine make/model:	2 x Pratt & Whitney Canada PW121

Notification

All time references in this statement are Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

The Area Control Centre at Copenhagen Airport, Kastrup (EKCH) notified the Aviation Unit of the Danish Accident Investigation Board (AIB) of the serious incident on 16-11-2021 at 15:37 hours (hrs).

The AIB notified the Danish Civil Aviation and Railway Authority (DCARA), the Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Division at the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Lithuania (LRTM), the French Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (BEA), the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), the Directorate-General for Mobility and Transport (DG MOVE), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) on 17-11-2021 at 09:37 hrs.

The LRTM and the BEA both appointed an accredited non-travelling representative to the AIB safety investigation.

FACTUAL INFORMATION

History of flight

The serious incident occurred during a scheduled IFR flight from Karup (EKKA) to Copenhagen, Kastrup (EKCH).

Approximately ten seconds after take-off, the flight crew noticed an electrical smell in the cockpit.

Within a few seconds, smoke appeared from below the glare shield. The intensity of the smoke was distinct, but not intense. After approximately five seconds, the flight crew observed no further smoke entering the cockpit.

The flight crew donned their oxygen masks and performed applicable checklist memory items.

The flight crew decided to return to EKKA, declared an emergency to Air Traffic Control and prepared the aircraft for landing.

No further abnormalities was observed during the remaining part of the flight.

This serious incident occurred in twilight and under Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).

Injuries to persons

<i>Injuries</i>	<i>Crew</i>	<i>Passengers</i>	<i>Others</i>
Fatal			
Serious			
None	3	35	

Fire and smoke inspections

After landing, the aircraft stopped on a taxiway and the Airport Fire and Rescue Services inspected the cockpit using a thermal camera. The inspection gave no rise to remarks.

With reference to the manufacturer procedure TSM A-26-XX-XX-00001-421A-A, the operator’s maintenance staff performed the “Smoke and burning smell” trouble shooting inspection.

The inspection revealed a popped circuit breaker for the no. 2 Very High Frequency (VHF) communication radio and burned electrical wires connecting the no. 2 VHF communication radio.

See figure no. 1.



Figure no. 1. Burned no. 2 VHF communication radio wiring (marked by red circle).

AIB safety investigation process

Upon ending the preliminary safety investigation, the AIB decided - in accordance with article 5 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 138 of the Danish Air Navigation Act - not to conduct any further safety investigations.

With reference to article 16 of EC Regulation No. 996/2010 and § 143 of the Danish Air Navigation Act, this statement closes the AIB safety investigation.